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* Most of the figures used in this discussion were adapted from Gruber and Wise 
(1999, 2007) or Milligan and Wise (forthcoming).  Figure 2 was adapted from a 
2007 talk at the U.S. State Department.  Axel Börsch-Supan has presented a very careful summary of the pension 
reforms in Europe.  He brings out the substantial complexity of getting from here 
to there.  And he emphasizes to critical dimensions of pension expenditures—the 
level of benefits and the duration of benefits.  I can’t offer important areas of 
improvement in his discussion.  Instead I will try to add additional framing and 
context to his analysis.  In particular, I emphasize, and hope to contribute to, an 
understanding of the core of the problem that has led to the need for reform.  In 
doing this, I will focus on working lives and years in retirement, the part that lies 
behind what Börsch-Supan terms the duration of benefits. 
 
  The core of the problem can is promises that can’t be met—ssocial 
security plan provisions that promise benefits that are often unsustainable.  Why?  
Countries did not adjust to the demographic changes that occurred over the past 
four decades.  They did not accommodate declining mortality and increasing life 
expectancy.  And countries did not adjust to changing health.  Expansions in 
“work capacity” were not matched by more work.  It is now too late to address the 
problem only by saving more.  Social and economic customs must adapt to 
demographic trends.  I will expand on three points:  
 
1.  Living longer and working less without regard to demographic trends 
2.  The relationship between employment of older workers and mortality 
(taken as one important indicator or health) 
3.  The change in employment by mortality over time and the implications for 
employment 
 
I will not discuss it further but I emphasize that working longer not only helps to 
pay for all costs associated with living  longer—social security and health care for 
example—but also other needs such as education of the young for which 
expenditure may be driven out by increasing resources allocated to older 
persons. 
 
1.  The Change in Work over three or four decades 
 
  First I will return to a figure that Börsch-Supan used in his paper.  The 
figure shows the labor force participation trends for men aged 60 to 64 from the 
1960s to the early 2000s—the data are shown for twelve countries in two parts, 
Figure 1a and Figure 1b.  These figures are an adaptation of those presented in 
Gruber and Wise (2007).  I emphasize three features of the data.  First in the 
early 1960s the differences in labor force participation rates across countries 
were relatively small, most between 70 and 85 percent.  This feature is marked 
by circles in each of the figures.  Second, by the mid 1990s, however, the 
difference had widened greatly, ranging from about 13 percent in France to about 
75 percent in Japan.  Third, the labor force participation rate started in increase 
in each of the countries in the mid 1990s, marked by vertical lines on each of the 
figures.  Six of the twelve countries are marked with arrows and in these 
countries the increase can be associated with pension reforms, changes in the provisions of the plans.  But the increase in labor force participation is common to 
all countries, suggesting that some of the increase may be due to other forces. 
 




























































   The decline in work was unrelated to, and in spite of, demographic trends.  
Figure 2 (adapted from a talk at the U.S. State Department 2007) shows the 
percent increase in life expectancy of men at 65, paired with the decline in the 
labor force participation of men age 60 to 64 between the 1960s and early 2000s.  
For example, in the U.S., life expectancy increased about 30 percent over this 
time period and labor force participation decreased by about 28 percent.  In 
France, life expectancy increased by 37 percent and labor force participation 
decreased by 77 percent. 
 
Figure 2.  Increase in life expectancy and decline 
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  Thus as life expectancy increased labor force participation was declining 
is all countries, but the change in labor force participation across countries was 
unrelated to demographic trends.  Figure 3 shows the relationship between the 
percent decline in labor force participation and the percent increase in life 
expectancy.  Excluding Japan there is essentially no relationship between the 
two; even including Japan the relationship is not statistically meaningful. 
 Figure 3. Change in LFP versus increase in life 
expectancy at 65 for men in 12 countries.
R
2 = 0.00













0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60%




































  But the relationship is strongly related to social security plan provisions.  
Figure 4 (Milligan and Wise forthcoming) shows the relationship between the 
percent decline in labor force participation and the “tax force to retire.”  To 
understand this measure it is useful to think of wage compensation for working 
an additional year in two components.  The first is wage earnings.  The second 
component is the increase in the expected present discounted value of promised 
future social security benefits.  It is natural to think of this difference as positive, 
or at least not negative.  That is, if a person works for an additional year and thus 
forgoes one year of benefits, it might be expected that benefits begun one year 
later would be increased enough to offset the fact that they are received for one 
fewer years.  In most countries, however, the accrual is significantly negative.  
This is a consequence in large part of not increasing benefits enough if the age 
of benefit receipt is delayed, i.e., benefits are not actuarially fair.  Thus the gain in 
wage earnings is partially, or even largely, offset by a loss in future social 
security benefits.  The ratio of this loss to wage earnings (after tax) is called the 
social security implicit tax on earnings (Gruber and Wise 1999).  In many 
countries this tax can be 80 percent or more at certain ages.  To provide a simple 
summary of the country-specific incentives for early retirement, the implicit tax 
rates on continued work are summed from age 55 or at the early retirement 
age—when a person is first eligible for social security benefits—and running 
through age 69. This measure is called the “tax force” to retire (Gruber and Wise, 
1999).  Figure 4 shows that this measure—based on plan provisions in the mid 
1990s is strongly related to the decline in labor force participation over the prior three of four decades.  That is, the decline in labor force participation was 
induced in large part by social security plan provisions. 
 
2.  Employment by age versus employment by mortality (“health”) 
 
  I explain that the cross-country variation in both employment by age and 
employment by mortality are similarly related to social security plan provisions—
the inducement to retire early inherent in social security plan provisions.  Figure 4 
(adapted from Milligan and Wise forthcoming) shows the relationship between 
age and employment in 7 countries.  Two features of the figure stand out.  First, 
at ages in the early 50s there was little difference across countries in the 
employment rate.  But by age 64 the difference had widened greatly, ranging 
from about 10 percent in France to almost 60 percent in Japan. 
 
  Now consider employment by mortality.  Figure 5 (adapted from Milligan 
and Wise forthcoming) shows this relationship for the same seven countries.  
Again two features of the figures stand out.  First, at the ages at which the 
mortality rate was about 0.5 percent, employment was very similar in all of the 
countries, approximately between 85 and 90 percent in each of the countries.  
But at the ages at which the mortality rate was 1.5%, the spread in the 
employment rate had become very large, from a low of 5 percent in France to 
about 50 percent in the U.S. 
 
  Now consider these two relationships—(1) the relationship between the 
tax force to retire and the proportion of men 55 to 65 not in the labor force and (2) 
the relationship between the tax force to retire and the proportion of men not in 
the labor force when the mortality rate is 1.5 percent.  Both are shown in Figure 6 
(adapted fromMilligan and Wise forthcoming).  The first relationship—the lower 
line in the figure—is as reported in Gruber and Wise (1999).  The second 
relationship follows essentially the same pattern.  That is the incentive effects 
inherent in social security pension plans are a strong determinant of work by age 
and a strong determinant of work by health (mortality) and the one relationship 
essentially mimics the other.  I conclude from these two relationships that 
mortality as a measure of health means the same thing in France and Italy as it 
does in the U.S.  If the tax force to retire were the same in France and Italy as in 
the U.S. the relationship suggest that work at older ages would be about the 
same in France and Italy as in the U.S. and work when health was the same (1.5 
percent mortality) would be about the same in France and Italy as in the U.S.  Or 
put another way, if plan provisions were similar, work by mortality (“health”) 





































































 Figure 6. The tax force to retire versus:  (1) men 55 
to 65 not in the labor force, and (2) men not in the 










































3.  Change in employment by mortality 
 
       Figure 7 (adapted from Milligan and Wise forthcoming) shows the 
employment rate by mortality in 1977 and 2007 in the U.S., together with 
selected ages corresponding to the mortality rate in each year (adopted from 
Milligan and Wise (forthcoming).  For example, consider the employment rate 
when the mortality rate was 1.5 percent.  In 1977, the employment rate was 80 
percent--corresponding to age 57.  In 2007, the employment rate was only 50 
percent when the mortality rate was 1.5 percent--corresponding to age 63.  That 
is, the probability of being employed when the mortality rate was 1.5 percent was 
0.8 in 1977 and 0.5 in 2007.
1  Thus on average at age 63 men worked 0.3 fewer 
years in 2007 than they did in 1977.  If we add up such differences from age 55 
to age 69, men in this age group worked on average 3.7 fewer years in 2007 
than in 1977 (8.3 versus 12.0 years, a decline of 31%).  In other words, if at each 
“health” level (measured by mortality) men had worked as much in 2007 as they 
did in 1977, average employment in the 55 to 69 age range would have been 3.7 
years greater in 2007 than it was.   
                                                 
1 Looking at the data another way, consider the age at which 50 percent of men 
were employed.  In 2007, the mortality rate at the age when 50 percent of men 
were employed was 2.7 percent; 30 years later in 2007, the mortality rate was 
only 1.5 percent.  That is to say, for the employment rate to be 50 percent in 
2007, men “had to be” much healthier (by the mortality measure) than they were 
in 1977.    
        Recall from Figure 2 that life expectancy of men at age 65 increased 30 
percent between 1977 and 2007.  Many analysts have suggested that official 
retirement ages—Social Security early and normal retirement ages—might be 
indexed in some way to life expectancy.  If the average retirement age were in 
fact indexed to mortality, beginning in 1977, employment of men aged 55-69 in 
2007 would have been greater than employment in 1977.   
 
  The differences in employment by “health” between countries are also 
very large.  For example, if employment by mortality level in 2007 had been the 
same in France as in the United States, employment in France in the 55 to 69 
age range would have been 4.62 years larger than it was. 
 







































  In summary, the need for reform of social security systems now has 
developed over time because countries failed to adapt to the demographic title 
wave that rolled over most countries in the past four or five decades.  Countries 
did not adjust institutional and economic policies to accommodate the 
demographic imperative, declining mortality and increasing life expectancy.  
Instead living longer was accompanied by working less.  Better health and 
expansions in “work capacity” were not matched by more work.  Now, working 
longer will likely be a component of reform in virtually all countries, consistent 
with Axel H. Börsch-Supan’s excellent summary and discussion.   . References: 
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